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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
Case No. 15169 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Respondent, 
Kennecott Copper Cdrporation, (hereinafter referred to 
as "Kennecott"), against Defendant-Appellant, Salt Lake 
County, (hereinafter referred to as "the County"), to 
recover those general ad valorem property taxes paid to 
the County by Kennecott under protest for tax year 
1976. 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
Kennecott filed an alternative Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment with regard to 
its First Cause of Action. 
The County filed an alternative Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment with regard to 
Kennecott's First and Second Causes of Action. The 
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Trial Court denied the County's Motions and took Kenne-
cott's alternative Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
or for Summary Judgment under advisement. Kennecott 
and the County submitted to the Trial Court legal 
memoranda. The Trial Court thereafter issued its 
Memorandum Decision granting Kennecott a Partial Summary 
Judgment. The Trial Court ruled that the County, under 
the facts as presented, was without legal authority to 
reset its mill levy after that date prescribed by 
statute. In denying the County's Motion, the Trial 
Court also ruled that this Court's decision in Salt Lake 
City Corporation et al. v. Salt Lake County, Case 
No. 14776 decided October 7, 1977, an original action 
filed in this Court in which Kennecott was a petitioner 
and the County a defendant, was not res judicata upon 
this action. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The County seeks reversal of the judgment of the 
Trial Court. Kennecott seeks to have this Court sustain 
the Trial Court's partial summary judgment as against 
the County. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 9, 1976, the County Board of Commissioners 
set the general Salt Lake County property tax mill levy 
at 14.42 mills. (Record 2-3,20). 
-2-
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On September 20, 1976, the County Board of Commis-
sioners attempted to reset that mill levy of August 9, 
1976 from 14.42 mills to 16 mills. (Record 3,20). 
On November 30, 1976 Kennecott paid the County 
those taxes assessed against Kennecott's real and personal 
taxable property for the tax year 1976. (Record 2-3,20). 
Concurrently with the payment on November 30, 1976 by 
Kennecott to the County, Kennecott also submitted to 
appropriate officials of the County a letter protesting 
the payment of certain portions of the general Salt Lake 
County property tax assessment levied against Kennecott 
for tax year 1976. (Record 3, 8-11, 20). In said 
letter of protest Kennecott specifically protested Three 
Hundred Ten Thousand Fifty-Two Dollars and Sixty-Eight 
Cents ($310,052.68) of that amount paid to Salt Lake 
County for taxes during tax year 1976. (Record 8). 
This amount paid under protest represented 1.58 mills of 
the mill levy assessed against Kennecott by the County 
pursuant to the general Salt Lake County property tax. 
Kennecott took the position in said protest letter that 
1.58 mills of the 16 mill general Salt Lake County 
property tax levied by Salt Lake County on September 20, 
1976 was illegal, having been attempted to be effectuated 
by the County following that date when Utah statutes require 
the County to set its general property tax mill levy. 
-3-
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(Record 8). Thereafter, on December 7, 1976 Kennecott 
filed in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County a Complaint against the County seeking refund of 
the amount paid under protest. (Record 2-6) . 
The County thereafter filed an Answer admitting the 
allegations of Paragraph 8 of the Complaint. 
Paragraph 8 of Kennecott's Complaint alleges as 
follows: 
On September 20, 1976 the Salt Lake 
County Board of County Commissioners 
attempted to reset the 1976 Salt Lake 
County General Property Tax mill levy 
to 16 mills from that adopted on 
August 9, 1976 of 14.42 mills. 
(Record 3). 
The County admitted the allegations of Kennecott in 
Paragraph 8 of the Complaint as follows: 
Answering Paragraph 8 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, Defendant admits that it 
did reset the 1976 General Salt Lake 
County Property Tax mill levy at 
16 mills on September 20, 1976, but 
denies each and every further allega-
tion contained therein. (Record 20) . 
Based upon the County's foregoing admission, 
Kennecott moved the Trial Court, on February 3, 1977, 
for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alternative for 
Summary Judgment. (Record 25-28). 
On February 17, 1977, the County moved the Trial 
Court for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alterna-
tive for Summary Judgment. (Record 33-37). The County's 
Motion stated in part: 
-4-
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The general thrust of Plaintiff's 
entire Complaint, including Plaintiff's 
First and Second Cause of Action and 
Plaintiff's prayer for relief is the 
same or substantially similar to the 
allegations and relief made and sought 
by the Plaintiff, Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, in its Petition for Extra-
ordinary Relief. 
2. Attached to this pleading is a 
certified copy of the Court's decision 
in Case No. 14776 in which Kennecott 
Copper Corporation, the Plaintiff 
herein, was one of the Petitioners. 
In that Court's opin~on, the identical 
issues presented by Plaintiff's 
Complaint in the instant action were 
passed upon and the Court in that case 
denied the Petition for Relief. 
Defendant asserts that the decision of 
the Utah Supreme Court in that case is 
binding upon Plaintiff in the instant 
action and the issues raised in that 
case are the same issues as are 
presently before this Court and have 
already been adjudicated by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah and are 
therefore res judicata as against the 
Plaintiff. (Record 36). 
On March 1, 1977, the Trial Court heard argument 
from both parties with respect to Kennecott's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment, and 
the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or 
for Summary Judgment. (Record 30,31). At that time 
the Trial Court denied the County's Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleadings or in the Alternative Summary Judgment 
and took Kennecott's Motion under advisement. There-
after, both Kennecott and the County submitted legal 
memoranda to the Trial Court with respect to Kennecott's 
-5-
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Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in the Alterna-
tive Summary Judgment. (Record 50-62 and 63-72). 
On April 4, 1977, the Trial Court issued a Memo-
randum Decision in which it granted Kennecott's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Record 73-76). In the Trial 
Court's Memorandum Decision, Judge Conder reasoned and 
found as follows: 
In this case the Court finds that Salt 
Lake County, on August 9, 1976, set the 
mill levy for taxation at 14.42 mills. 
Thereafter, on September 20, 1976, the 
County by a new resolution changed the 
mill levy to 16 mills. 
The issue to be decided by the Court is 
whether or not the imposition of a mill 
levy of 16 mills, voted upon by the Salt 
Lake County Commission September 20, 
1976, is lawful. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-9-6.3 requires the 
Board of County Commissioners of each 
county in the State of Utah levying an 
ad valorem property tax to fix the mill 
levy between the dates of the last 
Monday of July of each year, and the 
second Monday of August of each year. 
The applicable provision of §59-9-6.3 
reads as follows: 
'The Board of County Commissioners of 
each county must levy a tax on the 
taxable property of the county between 
the last Monday in the seventh month of 
each fiscal year, and the second Monday 
in the eighth month of each fiscal year, 
to provide funds for County purposes 
I 
The provision of §17-36-1 of the Utah Code 
Annotated also Provides: 
'On or before the second Monday in 
August of each year, the governing body 
shall levy a tax on the taxable real and 
personal property in the County . . . 
-6-
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In addition to the sections already 
cited, the Court calls attention to §59-
9-8 which provides for: 
'The governing body of each city and 
town, and the said Board of County 
Commissioners, must file a statement 
with the State Tax Commission, on or 
before the second Monday in August of 
each year, showing the amount and the 
purpose of each levy fixed by such 
governing body and board.' 
The Court finds that the words 'must' 
and 'shall' as set forth in the 59-9-6.3 
and 17-36-1 are mandatory and not merely 
directory. Black's Law Dictionary in 
referring to the word 'must' says: 
'This word, like the word 'shall' is 
primarily a mandatory affect. • 
An examination of the same word in 
'Words and Phrases' shows that generally 
speaking the use of the word 'must' is 
mandatory, not merely directory. 
In view of the provisions of §59-9-8 it 
seems that the Utah ~egislature has con-
sistently held to the levy being fixed 
by the second Monday in August of each 
year. That provision has been in the 
Code since the laws of 1923. Section 
59-9-6.3 was added to the law in 1961, 
and merely carries out the Legislative 
intent. 
Defendants refer the Court to 59-11-7 
which reads: 
'No assessment, or act relating to 
assessment, or collection of taxes, is 
illegal on account of informality or 
because the same was not completed 
within the time required by law.' 
The Court finds that there is a dis-
tinction between the assessment and 
the levy of the tax. McQuillen on 
Municipal Corporations, §44.92 states: 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
'Levy and assessment are distinct 
processes, and, except where otherwise 
provided by Statute, both are essential 
to taxation.' 
The Code citation above referred to 
relates to the 'assessment', whereas the 
first citations refer to the 'levy' of 
the tax. 
McQuillen on Municipal Corporations, 
Section 44.93 says: 'Whatever pre-
liminaries are by law made essential 
and mandatory, as distinguished from 
directory merely, to the levy of a 
tax, mu~t be observed or the tax will 
be void.' 
The same authority at Section 44.95 
states as follows: 'The time for making 
the levy is, in most jurisdictions, pre-
scribed by statute or charter. Unless 
such provision is directory merely, the 
taxing authorities may not disregard a 
definite provision as to the time for the 
making of the levy, or as to when the 
amount of the tax is to be determined and 
certified. Generally, only one levy a year 
is authorized for the same purpose; but 
where no time is fixed for the levy the 
ordinance may be passed at any time 
within the year.' 
'The applicable law governs as to the 
effective date of a levy, and as to the 
period covered thereby. It has been 
held that a municipality is authorized 
to levy taxes in anticipation of demands 
that will arise in the future. A levy 
of taxes by a city during the year of 
its incorporation generally is authorized.' 
The Court recognizes the general rule on 
statutory construction of revenue legisla-
tion as set forth in Sutherland on 
Statutes and Statutory Construction, 
Section 6701. General Rule. 1While the 
power to tax, and the exercise of that 
power is indispensable to the effective 
operation of government, the rule has 
become firmly established that tax laws 
are to be strictly construed against the 
state and in favor of the taxpayer. 
-8-
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Therefore, where there is reasonable 
doubt as to the meaning of a revenue 
statute it should be resolved in favor 
of those taxed.' 
For the foregoing reasons the Court 
grants the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and directs the Plaintiff to 
prepare an appropriate Order. 
Partial Summary Judgment was entered by the Trial 
Court on April 14, 1977. (Record 77-80). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE 
COUNTY'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE 
PLEADINGS OR FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS 
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT IN CASE NO. 
14776 IS NOT RES JUDICATA WITH RESPECT 
TO THIS CASE. 
In Point I of its brief the County asserts that the 
decision of this Court in Case No. 14776 is res judicata 
with respect to this appeal. A careful examination of 
Case No. 14776, Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt Lake 
County, and of this case, as well as pertinent authority 
with respect to the doctrine of res judicata, reveals 
this position to be clearly erroneous. 
Salt Lake City Corporation v. Salt Lake County, 
Utah Supreme Court Case No. 14776, was an original 
action by Kennecott and others in this Court seeking 
from this Court an extraordinary writ prohibiting the 
County from assessing, collecting or proceeding to 
assess and collect 1.58 mills of the general Salt Lake 
-9-
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County property tax mill levy. In that case this Court 
denied Kennecott and the other petitioners an extra-
ordinary writ. This Court did not issue an opinion 
setting forth the grounds for the denial of that petition. 
Rather, denial of the petition for an extraordinary writ 
in Case No. 14776 was accomplished by this Court via a 
minute entry which reads in full as follows: 
Minute Entry - Case No. 14776, Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Salt Lake County 
The petition for an extraordinary writ 
praying that respondents be: 1) prohibited 
from furnishing the services mentioned in 
section 17-34, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
as amended, until the provisions of that 
section having to do with a) taxing the 
property or b) charging a fee for such 
services, payable by persons benefited 
thereby in unincorporated areas, and should 
be prohibited for the reason that an increase 
in the mill tax levy was illegal as being ·· 
statutorily (section 59-9-6.3, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended) untimely 
and too late, is denied, and also it is 
ordered that any of the justices may make 
further or individual explanations in 
written opinions to be filed with the 
entry of this order or thereafter, by way 
of addenda thereto. 
Mr. Chief Justice Henroid dissented from 
such denial on the grounds it appears that 
such denial is: 1) contrary to this Court's 
decision in Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake 
County, 550 P.2d 1291, 1976, Case No. 14304, 
justifying the latter's reversal; and 
2) is a departure from the clear wording 
of section 17-31-4, (suyra.) (amounting 
to judicial legislation ; and 3) sanctions 
county commissions to ignore the section 
by using general fund monies for an un-
authorized purpose; and 4) there are no 
facts, and no precedent of this court, and 
no dispositive authority cited to justify 
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its conclusion that the existing mandatory 
statutory requirement that the tax levy 
"must" be accomplished on or before a 
stated date, can be construed to be a 
directory "may be accomplished inter-
diction." 
Mr. Justice Crockett votes to deny the 
petition for these reasons: that the 
Court has always been reluctant to inter-
fere with discretionary functions of 
other departments, including legislative 
and administrative bodies such as the 
County Commission, and will do so only 
under exigent circumstances; that the 
responsibility of setting the tax levy 
is reposed in the County Commission and 
generally the correction of inadvertances 
or errors herein is also within the 
Commission's prerogative; and this Court 
is asked to act in a great hurry to pass 
upon this controversy without a plenary 
basis for making such an adjudication. 
An examination of the filings submitted in Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah.Supreme Court Case 
No. 14776, reveals that the above cited decision denying 
Kennecott and the other petitioners' petition and motion 
for an extraordinary writ may have been upon a number of 
grounds other than the merits of the case. Those 
grounds are as follows: 
1. Kennecott and the other petitioners in Case No. 
14776 had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law and 
were therefore, as per terms of Rule 65(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, not entitled to an extraordinary 
writ prohibiting Salt Lake County from collecting 1.58 
mills of the purported general property tax mill levy. 
2. Utah Code Annotated §59-11-11, 1953 as amended, 
providing for the payment under protest of taxes and 
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suit for recovery thereafter, provides the exclusive 
method under Utah law for prohibiting taxing authority 
from collecting illegal taxes. 
3. Utah Code Annotated §59-11-10, 1953 as amended, 
prohibits the courts of the State of Utah from enjoining 
the collection of any tax. 
4. The action for an extraordinary writ by Kennecott 
and other petitioners in Case No. 14776 was not properly 
before the court in light of an appeal then pending 
before the Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake City, et al v. 
Salt Lake County, Third Judicial District Civil No. 
214675. 
See the County's Motion in Opposition to Petitioner's 
Petition and Motion for an Extraordinary Writ in Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Salt Lake County, Utah Supreme Court Case 
No. 14776, filed with this Court on October 1, 1976. 
In order for a judgment and/or decision in one case 
to have res judicata effect upon a subsequent action, 
the judgment and/or decision in the earlier case must 
have been on the merits. See 50 CJS Judgments, §627 at 
p.51; 46 Am.Jur.2d, Judgments, §§477-478 at pp.640-643; 
and 21 ALR.3d, Judgment Granting or Denying Writ of 
Mandamus or Prohibition as Res Judicata, §2 at p.213. 
Whenever there is doubt as to whether or not a decision 
in one case is a decision on the merits so as to have 
res judicata effect upon a subsequent action, the first 
decision cannot be considered to have been on the merits. 
-12-
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This rule is well stated in 21 ALR.3d, Judgment Granting 
or Denying a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition as Res 
Judicata, §12 at page 248 as follows: 
In a number of cases the courts 
have held or recognized the rule 
to the effect that a judgment 
denying a writ of mandamus without 
written opinion is not res judicata 
unless the sole possible ground of 
the denial was that the court acted 
on the merits or unless it affirma-
tively appears that such denial 
was intended to be on the merits. 
Again, at 21 ALR.3d, Judgment Granting or Denying a Writ 
of Mandamus or Prohibition as Res Judicata, §18 at p. 
256, it is stated as follows: 
In a number of cases the courts have held 
or recognized the rule to the effect that 
a judgment denying a writ of prohibition 
without written opinion is not res judicata 
unless the sole possible ground of the 
denial was that the court acted on the 
merits or unless it affirmatively appears 
that such denial was intended to be on 
the merits. 
The above stated rule has been distinctly and succinctly 
stated by a California Court of Appeals in Stearns v. Los 
Angeles City School District, 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 53 
Cal.Rptr. 482, 21 ALR.3d 164 (1966) as follows: 
The last action dictates that 
preliminary inquiry be directed to the 
question of whether the denial of the 
petition for a writ of prohibition is 
res judicata of the issues presented 
therein, and thereby precludes further 
consideration of the question which the 
districts seek to have reviewed herein. 
The subject was recently reviewed by 
this Court with the following conclusion: 
'Accordingly, the rule is well settled 
that a denial by the Supreme Court or 
-13-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the Appellate Court of an application for 
a writ without opinion, is not res judicata 
of the legal issues presented by the appli-
cation unless the sole possible ground of 
the denial was that the court acted on 
the merits, or unless it affirmatively 
appears that such denial was intended to 
be on the merits. [citations deleted] 
Respondents seek to come within the 
'sole possible ground' emphasized in the 
foregoing quotation. Examination of the 
cases cited reflects no situation where 
the exception was applied. In McDonough 
v. Garrison, where the emphasized words 
first occur, the following appears: 
'At the threshhold of this appeal we are 
met by the contention that, inasmuch as 
the precise jurisdictional points now 
urged for a reversal of the judgment were 
urged on the unsuccessful petitions for 
prohibition, and inasmuch as the only 
points briefed on those procedings were 
the jurisdictional questions, denials of 
such petitions must have been on the 
merits, and therefore such denials 
without opinion are res judicata and 
constitute binding determinations that 
the trial court had jurisdiction to 
proceed as it did.' [citations deleted] 
The majority opinion, which withstood a 
petition for hearing in the Supreme 
Court, rejected the view, expressed in 
the dissent, that the prior denial of a 
writ by the District Court of Appeal, 
and denials of rehearing of that ruling, 
and of an original application for a 
writ by the Supreme Court, were res 
judicata of the issue presented. It 
stated the rule as set forth in the 
above quotation and found two reasons 
why the petition might have been denied 
which are also pertinent here: First, 
'the various writs could have been 
denied because the courts involved felt 
that, although there was an apparent 
excess of jurisdiction, an appeal from 
the final judgment was a plain, speedy 
and adequate remedy. It is elementary 
law that even though a trial court is 
acting in excess of its ~urisdiction, 
an Appellate Court may, in its discretion, 
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refuse to interfere by prohibition if 
the same questions may be passed on by 
an appeal after judgment, and if, in the 
opinion of the Appellate Court such 
remed is lain, seedy and ade uate.' 
citation deleted]; and, secondly, 'the 
lower court had ordered a trial de nova 
before a jury. That order was not 
final. It was no more final than an 
order on a demurrer prior to entry of 
judgment is final. The trial court 
could have changed its order at any time 
before trial. When the petitions for 
writs of prohibition were filed the 
appellate courts may have denied them 
because they felt that the trial court 
would correct its error and not enter a 
final order in excess of its jurisdiction. 
The possibility that this may have been 
the basis of the denials prohibits such 
denials from becoming res judicata on the 
merits.' [citations deleted]. 
Id., 21 ALR.3d 164, 172-74. [Emphasis 
added]. See also Collins v. City and 
County of"San"""Francisco, 112 Cal.App.2d 
719, 247 P.2d 362, 365-366, (1952); 
McDonough v. Garrison, 68 Cal.App.2d 
318, 156 P.2d 983, 987-89 (1945); Kaufman 
v. Pima Junior College, 16 Ariz.App. 152, 
492 P.2d 32, 34-35 (1971); Griffith v. 
Stout Remodeling, Inc., 219 Kan. 408, 
548 P.2d 1238, 1243-44 (1976); and 
Hagan v. Superior Court of Los Angeles 
County, 57 Cal.2d 797, 22 Cal.Rptr. 206, 
371 P.2d 982, 984 (1962). 
The decision of this court in Salt Lake City Corp. 
et al v. Salt Lake County, Case No. 14776, does not 
affirmatively appear to be on the merits. Additionally, 
the sole possible ground of that decision, (Salt Lake City 
Corp. et al v. Salt Lake County, Utah Supreme Court Case 
No. 14776), as has been pointed out, supra, is not the 
merits of whether or not Salt Lake County may enact a 
taxing statute after the statutory deadline and have 
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such be effective. Therefore, clearly, according to the 
authorities above-cited, that case is not res judicata 
upon this action and the trial court was correct in its 
denial of the County's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, 
or for Summary Judgment. 
POINT II 
THE COUNTY IS REQUIRED TO SET ITS MILL 
LEVY BY THE SECOND MONDAY IN AUGUST OF 
EACH YEAR AND THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE SETTING BY 
THE COUNTY ON SEPTEMBER 20, 1976 WAS 
UNLAWFUL. 
In its Memorandum Decision granting Kennecott 
partial summary judgment, the Trial Court found as 
follows: 
In this case the court finds that Salt 
Lake County, on August 9, 1976, set the 
mill levy for taxation at 14.42 mills. 
Thereafter, on September 20, 1976, the 
county by a new resolution changed the 
mill levy to 16 mills. 
This finding is based upon the admissions by the County 
in its Answer. 
Utah statutes require the County to set its mill 
levy by the second Monday in August of each year. The 
Utah Legislature has in three separate statutory pro-
visions stated and reiterated this requirement. Those 
statutory provisons read in pertinent part as follows: 
The Board of County Commissioners of 
each county must levy a tax on the 
taxable property of the county between 
the last Monday in the seventh month of 
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each fiscal year and the second Monday 
in the eighth month of each fiscal year 
Utah Code Annotated, §59-9-6.3, 1953 
as amended, [Emphasis added]. 
On or before the second Monday in August 
of each year, the governing body shall 
levy a tax on the taxable real and~~­
personal property within the county. 
Utah Code Annotated, §17-36-31, 1953 as 
amended, [Emphasis added]. 
The governing body of each city and 
town, and each Board of County Com-
missioners, must file a statement with 
the State Tax Commission, on or before 
the second Monday in August of each 
year, showing the amount and purpose of 
each levy fixed by such governing body 
and Board. 
Utah Code Annotated, §59-9-8, 1953 as 
amended, [Emphasis added]. 
There is no question that the county possesses no 
power to levy any tax outside that conferred upon it by 
the Utah Legislature. This rule has been well stated by 
one authority as follows: 
The taxing power of the state is exclu-
sively a legislative function, and 
taxes can be imposed only in pursuance 
of legislative authority, although the 
general charge, control, and conduct of 
taxation are an executive function. In 
other words, the power to tax must be 
drawn from express statutory authority, 
there being no such thing as taxation 
by implication, and the legislative 
authority must be positive and not 
negative in nature. All doubts will be 
resolved against the taxing power • • • • 
The Legislature alone has the right and 
discretion to determine all questions of 
time, method, nature, purpose and extent in 
respect of the imposition of taxes, subjects 
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on which the power may be exercised, 
and all the incidents pertaining to tax-
ation from beginning to end . . . . 
84 CJS Taxation, §7, pp 51-56, [Emphasis 
added] . See also Certain Lots Upon Which 
Taxes arel5elinquent v. Monticello, 
159 Fla. 134, 31 So.2d 905, 909 (1947). 
This above-stated rule has been forcefully expli-
cated by the Washington Supreme Court in State ex rel 
Tacoma School District v. Kelly, 176 Wash. 689, 30 P.2d 
638, 639 (1934) I as fOllOWS! 
It is elementary that the power of taxa-
tion, subject to constitutional limitations, 
rests solely in the legislature. Municipal 
corporations have no inherent power to levy 
taxes. Their powers are derived through 
legislative grant, and are strictly construed. 
No implications are indulged in to expand the 
powers granted. 
[Emphasis added] . 
In summary, the County has no inherent power to 
tax; its power is derived solely from those legislative 
grants given it by the Utah Legislature. Therefore, the 
levying of any tax by the County must be accomplished in 
conformity with the relevant state statutes. 
The Utah Legislature has declared that the County 
must and shall set its tax levy by the second Monday in 
August of each year. See Utah Code Annotated §§59-9-6.3, 
59-9-8, and 17-36-31, supra. The use of these words, 
"must" and "shall," in the relevant statutory provisions 
impose upon the County a mandatory duty to set its tax 
levy by the second Monday in August. This construction 
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of the words "must" and "shall" as being mandatory has 
been stated by one court as follows: 
The word 'mandatory' has been used 
synonomously with 'indispensable' 
[Citation deleted] . A mandatory pro-
vision is one the omission to follow 
which renders the proceeding to which 
it relates illegal and void, while 
a directory provision is one the 
observance of which is not necessary 
to the validity of the proceedings. 
[Citation deleted] . 
Whether a statute is mandatory or 
directory does not depend upon its 
form, but upon the intention of the 
Legislature, to be ascertained from 
a consideration of the entire act -
its nature, its character, its 
reason, its object, and its subject 
matter, as well as the language used. 
[Citation deleted] . 
But the use of the word, 'shall', is 
usually interpreted to make the pro-
vision in which it is contained manda-
tor , es eciall if it is fre uentl 
repeated. Citation deleted . 
The court continued: 
[Shall] is defined as follows: 
In common, or ordinary parlance, 
and in its ordinary signification, 
the term 'shall' is a word of 
command, and one which has always, 
or which must be given a compulsory 
meaning; as denoting obligation. 
It has a preemptory meaning, and it 
is generally imperative or mandatory. 
It has the invariable significance 
of excluding the idea of discretio~, 
and has the significance of operating 
to impose a duty which may be enforced, 
Woodmansee v. Cockerill, 174 Ohio St. 11, 
185 N.E.2d 439, 443 (Ohio App. 1961). 
[Emphasis added] 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Court has, on numerous occasions, recognized 
that the terms "shall" and "must" as utilized in statutes 
impose a mandatory duty. See State v. Zeimer, 10 Utah 
2d 45, 48, 347 P.2d 1111, 1113 (1960), wherein this 
Court held that the use of the term "shall" in a criminal 
statute made compliance with the statute mandatory; and 
Glenn v. Ferrell, 5 Utah 2d 439, 304 P.2d 380 (1956) in 
which this Court held the use of the word "must" to impose 
a mandatory duty. 
This Court has explicitly recognized that use of the 
words "shall" and "must" in a statute impose upon relevant 
authority mandatory duties. In Cottonwood City Electors v. 
Salt Lake County, 28 Utah 2d 121, 499 P.2d 270 (1972) 
this Court, in ruling that a ~articular statute did not 
impose a mandatory duty, stated: 
It seems to us that if the Legislature 
had intended that the County Commission 
should have no discretion, . • . it 
could have simply [used the words) 
'shall' or 'must' ••• 
Id., 28 Utah 2d at 123, 499 P.2d at 
272. 
It is thus patently clear that use by the Utah 
Legislature of the terms "shall" and "must" in those 
statutes pertaining to the date upon which the County 
must set its mill levy imposes upon the County a mandatory 
duty to set said mill levy by that date so stated. 
That the terms "shall" and "must" are required to 
be construed as imposing a mandatory duty upon the 
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county when imposing taxes becomes even more clear in 
light of the rule that taxing statutes are to be strictly 
construed against the taxing authority and in favor of 
the taxpayer. This rule was succinctly stated by the 
United States Supreme Court in Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 
151, 153, 62 L.Ed. 211, 213, 38 s.ct. 53 (1917) as 
follows: 
In the interpretation of statutes 
levying taxes it is the established 
rule not to extend their provisions, by 
implication, beyond the clear import of 
the language used, or to enlarge their 
operations so as to embrace matters not 
specifically pointed out. In case of 
doubt they are construed most strongly 
against the government, and in favor of 
the citizen. 
[Emphasis added]. 
The above-stated rule has been specifically recog-
nized and enunciated as being the law in the State of 
Utah by this Court. In Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 9 Utah 2d 421, 426, 347 P.2d 179, 
182 (1959), this Court stated as follows: 
In harmony with the above is the well 
recognized rule that in case of ambiguity, 
uncertainty or doubt, taxing statutes 
are construed liberally in favor of the 
taxpayer and strictly against the 
taxing authority. 
See also Pacific Intermountain Express 
CO:- v. State Tax Commission, 8 Utah 2d 
144, 329 P.2d 650 (1958); and Ogden Union 
Railway and Depot Company v. State Tax 
commission, 16 Utah 2d 23, 395 P.2d 57 (1964). 
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Thus, if there is any doubt whatsoever that the 
meaning of the words "must" and "shall" as utilized by 
the Utah Legislature in Utah Code Annotated §§59-9-6.3, 
59-9-8, and 17-36-31, supra, have a directory or manda-
tory meaning, they are to be constructed as mandatory. 1 
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule that if 
taxes are not levied as per statutory directive those 
taxes cannot be imposed. This rule has been stated by 
one authority as follows: 
The time for making 
most jurisdictions, 
statute or charter. 
vision is directory 
authorities may not 
provision as to the 
the levy •••• 
the levy is, in 
prescribed by 
Unless such pro-
merely, the taxin~ 
time for making of 
16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, 
§44.95 at p.270, [Emphasis added] 
The Florida Supreme Court has directly dealt with 
the issue of whether or not a tax imposed after a statu-
tory deadline is legal and lawful. In Headley v. State 
ex rel Walker, 51 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 1951) the City of 
1 See also 16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, §44.13, 
pp. 40-41 and 3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, §66.01, 
p. 179, (D. Sans Ed., 4th Ed. 1974), wherein it is stated: 
[I]t is a settled rule that tax laws are. to be 
strictly construed against the state and in favor 
of the taxpayer. When there is reasonable doubt 
as to the meaning of a revenue statute, the doubt 
is to be resolved in favor of those taxed. This 
has been called a 'fundamental precept'. 
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Miami had during July prepared its budget, part of which 
was based on the amounts anticipated to be receivable 
based upon business license fees. Walker was assessed 
a license fee of $73.80 which he paid. The statute in 
question required the city to pass its appropriations 
not later than August 1 in any given year. On September 
7, the city enacted an ordinance which raised the amount 
on occupational licenses to $280.00. Walker was arrested 
for not paying the newly imposed occupational tax. The 
Florida Supreme Court held that the city could not 
impose a higher tax for the year in question, stating as 
follows: 
If the City of Miami under the guise of 
an emergency ordinance, has the power 
to levy an additional occupational tax 
against the petitioner's business after 
the general appropriation ordinance was 
enacted and the prescribed amount 
promptly paid, then what limitation of 
power, if any, would preclude the 
enactment of other and additional 
ordinances within the fiscal year? 
Such unrestrained taxing power by the 
city could destroy petitioner-appellee's 
dry cleaning business. The power of 
the city to further tax the dry cleaning 
business was exhausted when the appro-
priation ordinance was enacted. . . . 
Id., 51 So.2d at p.39. 
This precise issue was also addressed by the Illinois 
Supreme Court in People ex rel Ward v. Chicago & E. I. 
Ry. co., 365 Illinois 202, 6 N.E.2d 119 (1936). In that 
case the local Board of Supervisors held a meeting on 
December 12, 1934, in which they levied the county tax. 
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The specific statutory provision in question required the 
Board of Supervisors to hold an annual meeting on the 
second Tuesday of September at which the amount of tax 
to be raised was to be determined. The question presented 
was whether the Board of Supervisors had, on December 12th, 
the jurisdiction to levy the challenged tax. The Illinois 
Supreme Court held as follows: 
It requires no citation of authorities to 
sustain the statement that the power to 
tax is one laden with great responsibili-
ties and the exercise of such power 
should be strictly construed. Where 
the statute fixes a period withI'Il'Which 
or a day on which the tax is to be levied, 
time is of the essence of the power to levy 
and the command of the statute in that 
respect is mandatory. 
Id., 6 N.E.2d at 121 [Emphasis added]. 
The County levied 1.58 mills of its general property 
tax after that date prescribed by Utah statute for such 
levy. Therefore, that levy is null, void, and of no 
force and effect and the Trial Court was correct in 
granting Kennecott's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
with respect to its First Cause of Action. 
POINT III 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 59-11-7, 
1953 AS AMENDED, DOES NOT APPLY TO 
THE LEVY OF A TAX AND DOES NOT CURE 
THE COUNTY'S DEFECTIVE SEPTEMBER 20, 
1976 TAX LEVY. 
The County contends that Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, 
1953 as amended, is a general provision which cures any 
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irregularities accomplished by the County in the levying 
of its tax on September 20, 1976. As Kennecott will 
show hereinbelow, that position is in error. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, 1953 as amended, 
reads in full as follows: 
No assessment or act relating to assess-
ment or collection of taxes is illegal 
on account of informality or because 
the same was not completed within the 
time required by law. 
The above-cited Utah statutory provision, by its 
own terms, applies only to the assessment or collection 
of taxes, and not to the levying of a tax. The County's 
action which is here challenged by Kennecott is the 
attempted levy of a general ad valorem property tax by 
the Count~ on September 20, 1976, a date later than that 
prescribed for any such levy by the Utah Legislature. 
The levy of a tax by any taxing authority is not the 
assessment or collection, or an act relating to the 
assessment or collection, of taxes and hence the statute 
above relied upon QY the County is inapplicable and has 
no curative effect in this situation. 
Those statutes relating to the assessment, levy 
and collection of taxes in Title 59, Utah Code Annnotated, 
1953 as amended, treat such as follows: 
(1) Assessment of Taxes; Title 59, Chapter 5. 
(2) Levies; Title 59, Chapter 9. 
(3) Collection of Taxes; Title 59, Chapter 10. 
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In 16 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations, §44.92 
pp. 264-65, the distinction between the levy, collection 
and assessment of a tax is clearly pointed out as follows: 
[Al succinct definition of a tax levy 
is that it 'is the formal vote or 
action of the body authorized to make 
the levy.' It has been defined as 'the 
formal and official action of a legis-
lative body determining and declaring 
that a tax of a certain amount, or of a 
certain percentage on value, shall be 
imposed on persons and properties 
subject thereto.' To levy a tax is to 
determine by vote the amount of taxes 
to be raised. . . . 
Levy by the proper Legislative authority 
has been declared to be the first step in 
taxation and to be an essential jurisdic-
tional step, and consistent with this pro-
nouncement, no tax can be assessed or 
collected unless and until a levy is 
ordered by the proper authority. 
Levy and assessment are distinct pro-
cesses, and, except where otherwise 
provided by statute, both are essential 
to taxation. 
[Emphasis added] . 
This rule, supra, was well stated in Breckenridge v. 
County School Board, 146 Va. 1, 5, 135 S.E. 693, 695 
(1926), as follows: 
There is a marked difference between 
making a levy and the assessment of 
property for the purpose of taxation. 
A levy is merely fixing the subject and 
the amount on which the property is to 
be taxed. An assessment consists of 
listing the property and putting a 
value thereon to which the rate fixed 
by the levy is to be applied. 
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Furthermore, as was stated by the Nebraska Supreme 
Court in Lynch v. Howell, 165 Nebraska 525, 86 N.W.2d 
364, 365-66 (1957), as follows: 
The purpose of an assessment is to 
determine the ownership, quantity, and 
value of property for tax purposes as of 
the date fixed by statute, .•.. It 
involves no question of the power tO-tax 
.... [Citation deleted). The property 
is taxed by the city when the city 
levies the tax. 
An assessment is an official listing of 
owners and quantities of property with 
an estimate of the value of the property 
of each for the purpose of taxation on a 
day fixed by the Legislature . . . . 
[Citation deleted). The assessment of 
property does not involve the power to 
tax. The question of the power to tax 
arises at the time the levy of the tax 
is made. 
[Emphasis added) . 
Additionally, as has been stated by the Oregon 
Supreme Court in Oregon Worsted Company v. Chambers, 
217 Ore. 104, 342 P.2d 108, 114 (1959): 
The levy of a tax by the tax levying 
body and the process of its assessment 
and collection are separate and distinct 
functions in the total process of 
taxation. 
And finally, as has been stated by the Washington 
Supreme Court in Carkonen v. Williams, 76 Wash. 2d 617, 
458 P • 2d 280 t 286 (1969): 
The word ,·levy' when used in connection 
with the authority to tax, while assum-
ing other meanings through interchangeable 
or indiscriminate usage, strictly speaking 
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denotes the exercise of a legislative 
function, whether state or local, which 
determines that a tax shall be imposed, 
and fixes the amount, purpose, and subject 
of the action. 
Thus, to "levy" a tax is to declare that tax, fix 
the amount of same and ascertain what is to be taxed. 
"Assessment" is to determine the value of what is to be 
taxed to which a levy is to apply. "Collection" is the 
process of crediting to the taxing authority those 
revenues derived by applying a levy to an assessment. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, supra, addresses 
itself to the collection and assessment of taxes, but 
not to the levy of same. If the Utah Legislature had 
intended that statute's provisions to apply to the levy 
of taxes, it could have easily so stated. 
Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, does not cure an 
improper levy of a tax. Therefore, in light of the 
principles above stated that the "power to tax must be 
drawn from express statutory authority", emphasis 
added, that there is no such thing as taxation by 
implication", and that "[a]ll doubts must be resolved 
against the taxing authority," and because the Legis-
lature did not expressly declare the curative effects 
of Utah Code Annotated §59-11-7, supra, to apply to 
"levies" its provisions do not cure the County's 
defective levy. 
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CONCLUSION 
As has been clearly shown from the foregoing the 
ad valorem general property tax mill levy by the County 
on September 20, 1976 of 16 mills is illegal and un-
collectible. Only the general property tax mill levy 
by the County accomplished on August 9, 1976 of 14.42 
mills is valid and collectible and the Trial Court was 
correct and should be sustained in its granting to 
Kennecott Partial Summary Judgment in this action. 
1977. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~~'day of September, 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
79 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone No. (801) 532-1234 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered two 
(2) true and accurate copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT to R. Paul Van Darn, Salt Lake 
County Attorney, City & County Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111; and to Bill Thomas Peters, Special 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney, 400 Chancellor Building, 
220 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; this 
~day of September, 1977 • 
. •,' 
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